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Abstract –In Wireless Ad hoc network Stealthy packet dropping is a suite of four attacks—misrouting, power control,
identity delegation, and colluding collision—that can be easily launched against multi hop wireless ad hoc network. Stealthy
packet dropping disrupts the packet from reaching the destination through malicious behavior at an intermediate node. In the
same way Mobile ad hoc network also having the different types of attacks in network layer such as flooding attacks,
rushing attacks, black hole attacks, gray hole attacks, wormhole attacks, sinkhole attacks, and Sybil attacks. We analyses
different routing protocols and its route discovery technology.
Keywords – Wireless Ad hoc network, Mobile Ad-hoc Networks, Routing Attacks, Routing Protocols, Route Discovery

I. INTRODUCTION
black hole attacks, gray hole attacks, wormhole
attacks, sinkhole attacks, and Sybil attacks. The rest
of paper is organized as follows; section 2 presents
routing algorithms types such as table driven, on
demand routing protocols and we describe some
routing protocols. Section 3 provides details
description about various different types of attacks
such as misrouting, power control, identity
delegation, and colluding collision, flooding attacks,
rushing attacks, black hole attacks, gray hole attacks,
wormhole attacks, sinkhole attacks, and Sybil attacks
and section 4 gives the conclusion of the paper.

Ad hoc networks are a promising paradigm for easy
communication, especially the wireless ad hoc
network for mobile hosts. Ad hoc network requires
no fixed infrastructure or any kind of central servers.
All nodes in ad hoc manner usually have equivalent
status in the services. Nodes are connected either
directly if within the radio range or via the
intermediary nodes, which relay messages as routers,
for remote destinations. Frequent changes such as
positions and available status of the nodes can be
accepted without severely influence on the quality of
services. The ad hoc networks can adjust its topology
dynamically. The pleasing characteristics above bring
good benefits, for example, fast deployment, selforganize and great flexibility, surpassing other
traditional networks [4].

II. PROTOCOLS
MANET routing protocols can be categorized into 2
classes as: table-driven/proactive and source-initiated
(demand-driven)/reactive and some other protocols
[10]. In this section we describe the routing protocols.

However, many applications run in untrusted
environments and require secure communication and
routing. Applications that may require secure
communications include emergency response
operations, military or police networks, and safetycritical business operations such as oil drilling
platforms or mining operations. Ad hoc networks
generally use a wireless radio communication
channel. The main advantages of such networks are
rapid deployment and low cost of operation, since the
nodes and wireless hardware are inexpensive and
readily available, and since the network is
automatically self-configuring and self-maintaining.
However, wireless networks are vulnerable to several
attacks. In most wireless networks, an attacker can
easily inject bogus packets, impersonating another
sender. We refer to this attack as a spoofing attack.

A. Table – Driven Routing Protocols
Table-driven routing protocols attempt to maintain
consistent, up-to-date routing information from each
node to every other node in the network. These
protocols require each node to maintain one or more
tables to store routing information, and they respond
to changes in network topology by propagating
updates throughout the network in order to maintain a
consistent network view. The areas in which they
differ are the number of necessary routing-related
tables and the methods by which changes in network
structure are broadcast. Some of the table – driven
routing protocols are Destination-Sequenced
Distance-Vector (DSDV), Optimized link state
routing (OLSR) protocol, Wireless routing protocol
(WRP) and Cluster head gateway switch routing
(CGSR) protocol [4]. In this section, we discuss about
DSDV and OLSR protocols.

In this paper we studied different types attacks, such
as misrouting, power control, identity delegation,
colluding collision, flooding attacks, rushing attacks,
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message contains its own address and the list of its
one-hop neighbors. By exchanging HELLO
messages, each node can learn a complete topology
up to two hops. HELLO messages are exchanged
locally by neighbor nodes and are not forwarded
further to other nodes. A TC message is the message
that is used for route calculation. In OLSR, each
MPR node advertises TC messages periodically. A
TC message contains the list of the sender’s MPR
selector. In OLSR, only MPR nodes are responsible
for forwarding TC messages. Upon receiving TC
messages from all of the MPR nodes, each node can
learn the partial network topology and can build a
route to every node in the network. For MPR
selection, each node selects a set of its MPR nodes
that can forward its routing messages. In OLSR, a
node selects its MPR set that can reach all its two-hop
neighbors. In case there are multiple choices, the
minimum set is selected as an MPR set.

1) Destination-sequenced distance-vector (DSDV):
The Destination-Sequenced Distance-Vector (DSDV)
routing protocol [11] is a table-driven algorithm. In
DSDV every node in the network maintains a routing
table in which all of the possible destinations within
the network and the number of hops to each
destination are recorded. Each entry is marked with a
sequence number assigned by the destination node.
The sequence numbers enable the mobile nodes to
distinguish stale routes from new ones, thereby
avoiding the formation of routing loops. Routing
table updates are periodically transmitted throughout
the network in order to maintain table consistency. To
help alleviate the potentially large amount of network
traffic that such updates can generate, route updates
can employ two possible types of packets: full dump
and smaller incremental packets. Each of these
broadcasts should fit into a standard-size of network
protocol data unit (NPDU), thereby decreasing the
amount of traffic generated. The mobile nodes
maintain an additional table where they store the data
sent in the incremental routing information packets.
New route broadcasts contain the address of the
destination, the number of hops to reach the
destination, the sequence number of the information
received regarding the destination, as well as a new
sequence number unique to the broadcast. The route
labeled with the most recent sequence number is
always used. In the event that two updates have the
same sequence number, the route with the smaller
metric is used in order to optimize (shorten) the path.
Mobiles also keep track of the settling time of routes,
or the weighted average time that routes to a
destination will fluctuate before the route with the
best metric is received. By delaying the broadcast of a
routing update by the length of the settling time,
mobiles can reduce network traffic and optimize
routes by eliminating those broadcasts that would
occur if a better route was discovered in the very near
future.

B. On demand Routing Protocols
On demand protocols create routes only when desired
by source nodes [13, 15]. When a node requires a
route to destination, it initiates route discovery
process within the network. This process is
completed once a route is found or all possible route
permutations are examined. Once a route is
discovered and established, it is maintained by route
maintenance procedure until either destination
becomes inaccessible along every path from source or
route is no longer desired. In this section we describe
Ad hoc on-demand distance vector (AODV) and
Dynamic Source Routing (DSR).
1) Ad hoc on-demand distance vector (AODV):
AODV [13, 14] is an improvement of DSDV
algorithm previously described. It is typically
minimizes the number of required broadcasts by
creating routes on a demand basis, while DSDV
algorithm maintain a complete list of routes. The
authors of AODV classify it as a pure on demand
route acquisition system, since nodes that are not on a
selected path do not maintain routing acquisition or
participate in routing table exchanges. In AODV,
when a source node S wants to send a data packet to a
destination node D and does not have a route to D, it
initiates route discovery by broadcasting a route
request (RREQ) to its neighbors. The immediate
neighbors who receive this RREQ rebroadcast the
same RREQ to their neighbors. This process is
repeated until the RREQ reaches the destination
node. Upon receiving the first arrived RREQ, the
destination node sends a route reply (RREP) to the
source node through the reverse path where the
RREQ arrived. The same RREQ that arrives later will
be ignored by the destination node. In addition,
AODV enables intermediate nodes that have
sufficiently fresh routes to generate and send an
RREP to the source node.

2) Optimized link state routing (OLSR) protocol:
Optimized link state routing (OLSR) protocol [12] is
a proactive routing protocol and based on periodic
exchange of topology information. The key concept
of OLSR is the use of multipoint relay (MPR) to
provide an efficient flooding mechanism by reducing
the number of transmissions required. In OLSR, each
node selects its own MPR from its neighbors. Each
MPR node maintains the list of nodes that were
selected as an MPR; this list is called an MPR
selector list. Only nodes selected as MPR nodes are
responsible for advertising, as well as forwarding an
MPR selector list advertised by other MPRs.
Generally, two types of routing messages are used in
the OLSR protocol, namely, a HELLO message and a
topology control (TC) message. A HELLO message
is the message that is used for neighbor sensing and
MPR selection. In OLSR, each node generates a
HELLO message periodically. A node’s HELLO
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destination node. The energy consumed by a packet
when traversing through a path is the sum of the
energies required at every intermediate hop in that
path. This metric maintain the uniform consumption
of power throughout the network.

2) Dynamic Source Routing (DSR):
Dynamic source routing (DSR) protocol is an ondemand routing protocol that is based on the concept
of source routing [15]. Mobile nodes are required to
maintain route caches that contain the source routes
of which the mobile is aware. Entries in the route
cache are continually updated as new routes are
learned. The protocol consists of two major phases:
route discovery and route maintenance. When a
mobile node has a packet to send to some destination,
it first consults its route cache to determine whether it
already has a route to the destination. If it has an
unexpired route to the destination, it will use this
route to send the packet. On the other hand, if the
node does not have such a route, it initiates route
discovery by broad-casting a route request packet.
This route request contains the address of the
destination, along with the source node’s address and
a unique identification number. Each node receiving
the packet checks whether it knows of a route to the
destination. If it does not, it adds its own address to
the route record of the packet and then forwards the
packet along its outgoing links. To limit the number
of route requests propagated on the outgoing links of
a node, a mobile only forwards the route request if
the request has not yet been seen by the mobile and if
the mobile’s address does not already appear in the
route record. A route reply is generated when the
route request reaches either the destination itself, or
an intermediate node which contains in its route
cache an unexpired route to the destination. By the
time the packet reaches either the destination or such
an intermediate node, it contains a route record
yielding the sequence of hops taken.

ii) Maximize Network Connectivity
This metric attempts to balance the routing load
among the subset of the nodes in the network
iii) Minimum Variance in Node Power Levels
This metric propose to distribute the load among all
the nodes in the network. So the power consumption
pattern remains uniform across them.
iv) Minimum cost per Packet
To maximize the life time of every node in the
network, this routing metric is made as a function of
the state of the node’s battery. The cost decrease with
an increase in its battery charge. With the availability
of a battery discharge pattern, the cost of a node can
be computed.
v) Minimize Maximize node Cost
This metric minimize the maximum cost per node for
a packet after routing a number of packets.
III. CLASSIFICATION OF ATTACKS
Flooding Attacks:
In flooding attack, the malicious node can send a
large number of RREQs in a short period to a
destination node that does not exist in the network.
Because no one will reply to the RREQs, these
RREQs will flood the whole network. As a result, all
of the node battery power, as well as network
bandwidth will be consumed and could lead to
denial-of-service. In flooding attack, attacker
exhausts the network resources, such as bandwidth
and to consume a node’s resources, such as
computational and battery power or to disrupt the
routing operation to cause severe degradation in
network performance. Flooding attacks are classified
into

C. Power - aware Routing Protocols:
In a deviation from the traditional wired network
routing and cellular wireless network routing, power
consumption by the nodes is a serious factor to be
taken into consideration by routing protocols for ad
hoc wireless networks. This section discusses some
of the important routing metrics that take into
consideration this energy factor.
1) Power-Aware Routing Metrics
The limitation on the availability of power for
operation is a significant bottleneck, given the
requirements of portability, weight, and size of
commercial hand-held devices. Hence, the use of
routing metrics that consider the capabilities of the
power sources of the network nodes contributes to the
efficient utilization of energy and increase the
lifetime of the network. The routing protocols that
select paths so as to conserve power must be aware of
the states of the batteries at the given node as well as
at the other intermediate nodes in the path.

RREQ Flooding Attack
DATA Flooding Attack
2) RREQ Flooding Attack
In the RREQ Flooding Attack, the attacker sends
RREQ (Route –Request) packet for unknown node in
network, each node will rebroadcast fake RREQ
packet to entire network. It makes entire network
with RREQ packets. The malicious node breaks the
RREQ-RATELIMT, It makes entire network with
RREQ packets. This results in the situation that the
communication bandwidth is exhausted by the
flooded RREQ packets. The node resource such as
battery is consumed by flooding packets.

i) Minimal Energy Consumption per Packet
This metric aims at minimizing the power consumed
by a packet in traversing from source node to
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2) DATA Flooding Attack
In this attack, the attack node builds up paths to all
nodes in the network. Then, the attacker sends large
volumes of useless DATA packets to all nodes along
these paths. The mass useless DATA packets will
exhaust the communication bandwidth in the network
and the destination node will be busy for receiving
the excessive useless packets from the attack node
and therefore cannot work normally [3].

C

B

D

A

B. Rushing Attacks
In rushing attack, if a node want to discover route for
target node, then it will initiates a Route Discovery
for the target node, the attacker could capture the
RREQ and the attackers rebroadcast that RREQ. If
the RREQ for this Discovery forwarded by the
attacker are the first to reach each neighbor of the
target then any route discovered by this Route
Discovery will include a hop through the attacker.
That is, when a neighbor of the target receives the
rushed RREQ from the attacker, it forwards that
RREQ, and will not forward any further RREQ from
this Route Discovery. When non-attacking RREQs
arrive later at these nodes, they will discard those
legitimate RREQ [5], as a result, the initiator will be
unable to discover any usable routes (i.e., routes that
do not include the attacker) containing at least two
hops (three nodes). In general terms, an attacker that
can forward RREQ more quickly than legitimate
nodes can do so, can increase the probability that
routes that include the attacker will be discovered
rather than other valid routes [5].

E
Fig. 1 Blackhole Attack

D. Wormhole Attacks
A wormhole is a tunnel which connects two remote
nodes [7]. A particularly devastating security attack
known as a wormhole has been discussed in the
context of ad-hoc networks where a malicious node
records packet in one location and with the help of
another colluding node replays the packet in a distant
part of the network. The colluding nodes can use
communication techniques such as an out-of-band
channel (a point-to-point link) or high power
transmission (using directional antennas) to tunnel
packets. This tunneling enables the tunneled packet to
arrive with fewer hops or lower delay than if the
packet traversed a normal path.
The arrival of packets with low delay or hop count
attracts nearby traffic towards the malicious node,
thus affecting routing [1]. In a wormhole attack, an
attacker builds the tunnel between two points. An
attacker receives packets at one point in the network,
sends them (through tunnel) to another point in the
network, and then replays them into the network from
that point. This creates the false impression that the
two end points of the tunnel are very close to each
other [8]. This tunneling enables the tunneled packet
to arrive with fewer hops or lower delay than if the
packet traversed a normal path. A wormhole is a
tunnel which connects two remote nodes. As shown
in Fig. 2, the upper black dot called as M1 and lower
black dot called as M2. The attacker tunnels the
routing beacon from M1 to M2.

C. Blackhole Attacks and Gray hole Attacks
In a blackhole attack, a malicious node sends fake
routing information, claiming that it has an optimum
route and causes other good nodes to route data
packets through the malicious one [6]. For example,
in AODV, the attacker can send a fake RREP
(including a fake destination sequence number that is
fabricated to be equal or higher than the one
contained in the RREQ) to the source node, claiming
that it has a sufficiently fresh route to the destination
node. This causes the source node to select the route
that passes through the attacker.
Therefore, all traffic will be routed through the
attacker, and therefore, the attacker can misuse or
discard the traffic. In a gray hole attack, a malicious
node refuses to forward certain packets and simply
drops them. If a malicious node drops all the packets,
the attack is then called a black hole which is easy to
detect as opposed to a gray hole attack in which the
attacker selectively drops the packets [7]. Fig. 1
shows an example of a black hole attack, where
source node S sends RREQ for node D, the attacker
node E sends RREP that, it has route for D with
highest sequence number. So that node S starts
further packet transfer with node E and S discards
other RREP

The nodes in the remote area build the route through
the wormhole located between M1 and M2. All the
traffic in the remote area will be channeled through
the wormhole. Now nodes which are near to M1 are
considered as one hop neighbor to nodes which are
near to M2. The devices used to mount the attack do
not need to hold any valid network Ids and, hence, the
adversary does not need to compromise any
cryptographic quantities or network nodes in order to
perform the attack. However, the wormhole puts the
attacker in a very powerful position relative to other
nodes in the network. The attacker discards rather
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service to legitimate nodes by reducing their share of
the resource, and gives the attacker more resources to
perform other attacks.
F. Summary of the Stealthy Attacks
(i)
Misrouting
Relays the packet to the wrong next
hop.
(ii)
Power control
Control the transmission to the exclude
next hop.
(iii)
Colluding Collision
Simultaneous transmission to create a
collision at the next hop.
(iv)
Identity delegation
Delegate the relay responsibility to a
colluding partner close to the sender.

than forwarding all the data packets. Thereby, it
creates a permanent denial-of-service attack, where
the base station cannot receive any information from
the target area.

BS

Fig 2. Route discovery with wormhole attack
E. Sybil Attack

IV. CONCLUSION

In Sybil attack, a node illegitimately claims multiple
identities. The Sybil attack was first described by
Douceur in the context of peer-to-peer networks [10].

In this paper we studied different routing protocols
and routing attacks. We survived route discovery
technology in different important routing protocol
algorithms. We studied different routing attacks. In
this study, we discover wormhole attack cause more
harm in network as well as it is difficult identified in
network and it can possible to make Denial of Service
(DOS). Sybil attacks are especially harmful as they
are often the gateway to other attacks. The many
attacks are launch at network layer and with route
request packets

Sybil attacks are especially harmful as they are often
the gateway to other attacks (such as those on
resource exhaustion, voting, etc.). In [11] authors
discussed various attacks which are launched by sybil
attacks, these are, distributed storage, data
aggregation, voting, fair resource allocation,
misbehavior and routing.
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